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Abstract
Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means
to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view
and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether
communication mitigates or intensies the problem of collective action. We
observe the eect of dierent communication structures on collective action
in the context of nitely repeated intergroup conict and demonstrate that
conict expenditures are signicantly higher if communication is restricted
to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. How-
ever, expenditures are signicantly lower if open communication within one's
own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open
communication intergroup conicts are avoided by groups taking turns in
winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communica-
tion for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate
the destructive nature of intergroup conicts.
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A substantial amount of resources is allocated for rivalry, conict, and rent-
seeking activities which typically lack any direct productive value (Krueger,
1974; Mohammad and Whalley, 1984; Congleton, 1986). In 2009, in the
USA, companies, labor unions, and other organizations spent $ 3.48 bil-
lion to lobby Congress and federal agencies.1 Likewise, Angelopoulos et al.
(2009) estimate that in the Euro area 18 percent of the collected tax revenues
are extracted as rents. R&D competition, where rms tend to imitate each
other's research strategies (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), electoral competi-
tion through strategic allocation of campaign resources (Snyder, 1989), and
expenses for socio-political conicts are other examples of economic behaviors
which involve personal and social costs that could be reduced if institutions
are designed such that the perverted incentives of rent-seeking are avoided.
A large number of studies suggest that communication may have the
power to mitigate collective action problems (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Os-
trom et al., 1992, 1994; Ledyard, 1995). Observations from laboratory ex-
periments where communication is studied in a controlled manner indicate
a large positive impact of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas
(for meta-analyses of this literature see (Sally, 1995) and more recently (Bal-
liet, 2010)). While this suggests that communication may be a universal
means to mitigate collective action problems, little is known about the con-
sequences of communication for collective action problems that do not have
the features of a social dilemma but of intergroup rivalry or conict.
1http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php; retrieved on May 28, 2010.
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clear in intergroup conicts. Groups face internal incentive problems that
may undermine the achievement of their goal setting. In particular, two
contrarian forms of cooperation are expected to play a role: (i) Cooperation
within groups, which occurs if group members manage to avoid free-riding
and spend resources on conict expenditures to increase the chance that their
own group wins, and (ii) cooperation between rivaling groups, which occurs
if members of the rivaling groups achieve mutual understanding to avoid
unnecessary waste of resources on conict expenditures. Therefore, com-
munication may enhance cooperation within groups, leading to intensied
intergroup rivalry that increases socially wasteful conict expenditures. Yet,
communication may at the same time help to establish cooperative agree-
ments between rivaling groups, leading to reductions in combined conict
expenditures.
In this study, we use laboratory methods to test the impact of dierent
communication structures on conict expenditures in an intergroup contest
game characterized by these two forms of cooperation and conict. We chose
an experimental setting because it renders it possible to unpack the com-
plex decision problem characteristic of a multilevel conict into a simple
experimental design. This design allows systematic examination of various
communication structures which may shift the focus between these two forms
of cooperation keeping other variables constant. The studied game is based
on Tullock's contest model (Tullock, 1967, 1980) where two parties compete
for one indivisible prize which is equally distributed among the members of
the winning party. The probability of winning the prize for each party is
equal to the proportion of its investment out of the total investments by all
3
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elements of a public good as all individual players have an opportunity to
free-ride on the conict expenditures of their own group members.
We study the intergroup conict in four dierent treatments. In all treat-
ments, two groups of four players compete for one prize for 20 periods. In
the baseline treatment, no communication is possible. In the restricted com-
munication treatment, players can communicate via online chat with their
own group members but not with the members from the rivaling group. In
the open communication treatment, players can communicate via online chat
with their own group members as well as with the members from the rivaling
group. In addition, we present a treatment with restricted communication
and peer-punishment where players can punish their own group members.
Our results show that players waste large amounts of money on conict ex-
penditures above the standard equilibrium level in all treatments. However,
there are vast and signicant dierences in conict expenditures between
treatments. We nd that conict expenditures are signicantly higher in the
restricted communication treatment (582 percent above the standard equi-
librium level) than in the no communication treatment (404 percent above
the standard equilibrium level). At the same time, we nd that conict ex-
penditures are signicantly lower (41 percent above the standard equilibrium
level) if there is open communication within and between groups compared
to the restricted communication and the no communication treatment. We
observe that conict expenditures are similar in the case of restricted com-
munication if group members are given the additional possibility to punish
their own group members. While conict expenditures are shown to depend
on the communication structure, communication independent of its structure
4
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persion of individual conict expenditures is smaller than in the treatment
without communication.
Our econometric analysis reveals that communication shifts the focus of
conditional behavior from one's own party to the behavior of the conicting
party. Importantly, we nd that groups decrease conict expenditures in
the consecutive period after winning the conict in the open communication
treatment. This suggests that conict expenditures are omitted by rivaling
groups to take turns in winning the conict. A content analysis of the com-
munication exchanged in this treatment corroborates this conjecture. Turn
taking proves to be a widely applicable cooperation strategy as it has been ob-
served among individuals in a range of institutions outside the laboratory in
environments such as in inshore sheries (Berkes, 1992) or farmer-governed
irrigation systems (Ostrom, 1990). While our results dovetail with earlier
observations pertaining to individual behavior, we provide novel empirical
evidence showing that the turn-taking behavior may evolve and maintain
cooperation also between groups of unrelated individuals in nitely repeated
interactions.
Our paper is related to other experimental work studying contest games
and team tournaments. The literature on contest games shows, like our
study, that conict expenditures typically exceed the opportunistic bench-
mark (Isaac and Reynolds, 1988; Millner and Pratt, 1989; Shogren and Baik,
1991; Potters et al., 1998;  Onc uler and Croson, 2005; Parco et al., 2005; Kon-
rad, 2009).2 These studies, however, do not investigate intergroup conict
2For surveys on theoretical work on contest models consult (Nitzan, 1994) and more
recently (Konrad, 2007).
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study are Abbink et al. (2010) who do not investigate communication but
study contests between groups, showing that conict expenditures dramati-
cally increase if players have an option to punish their own group members.
Our paper qualies their ndings insofar as we show that the detrimental
eect of punishment on conict expenditures is not present if players have
an opportunity to communicate with their own group members.
The literature on team tournaments has shown that competition between
teams increases team members' eorts in the absence (Nalbantian and Schot-
ter, 1997; van Dijk et al., 2001) and presence of communication (Sutter and
Strassmair, 2009). Sutter and Strassmair (2009) also demonstrate that eort
levels depend on the type of communication. They nd that the invested
eort level is highest if communication is restricted within team, lowest if
there is no communication, and in between if there is open communication
within and between teams. Their ndings are thus similar to ndings show-
ing that allowing for (more) communication (within and between teams) may
have socially undesirable eects due to collusion between market participants
(McCutcheon, 1997; Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; Aoyagi, 2007). In con-
trast, our study demonstrates in the context of collective action that open
communication can have socially desirable eects due to its capability to help
rivals in avoiding unproductive conict expenditures whereas restricted com-
munication can have socially undesirable eects because it increases conict
expenditures even when compared to the no-communication situation.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on intergroup conicts in
social psychology starting from the seminal Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif
et al., 1961) to numerous structural and motivational approaches proposed
6
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(Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). This has consequently led to various lab-
oratory (Bornstein and Erev, 1994) and eld (Erev et al., 1993) studies on
intergroup conicts in social dilemmas. The nding that competition against
another group in social dilemmas increases within group cooperation is re-
garded as an exceptionally robust result in the social psychology literature
(for an overview see Bornstein 2003).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we in-
troduce the experimental design. In section 3, we characterize several bench-
mark expenditure levels relaxing the assumption that communication may
enhance cooperation and coordination only through self-interested oppor-
tunism. After presenting and analyzing the data in section 4, we conclude in
section 5 with a brief discussion of our results.
2. Experimental Design
Our conict model between two rivaling groups is based on Abbink et
al. (2010). Our experimental design consists of four treatments with vary-
ing communication structures and opportunities to punish. In the baseline
treatment (NOCOM), the contest game is implemented without communica-
tion opportunities between participants. This treatment serves as a control
condition and creates a clean benchmark that is used to assess the eects of
dierent communication structures.
The restricted communication treatment (REST) allows participants to
send messages within their own group, but rules out all explicit means to
communicate between participants that belong to distinct conict parties.
The open communication treatment (OPEN) oers an open communication
7
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messages are public for all members in both groups. The fourth treatment
(REST+PUN) combines intra-group communication with an opportunity to
punish one's own group members, but not members of the other group.
The conict between the two groups (X and Y) with four members in
each group was repeated for 20 identical periods with a partner matching
protocol to capture the dynamic pattern of group conicts, meaning that
both the composition of groups and conict pairs stayed intact throughout
the whole game. Participants' experimental identities used to inform other
group members about individual expenditures were reshued after each pe-
riod to rule out reputation eects. At the beginning of all 20 periods, each
group member received an endowment of 1000 monetary units (MUs) and
had an opportunity to contribute any integer amount xi to a group account.
Any MU not contributed to the group account automatically remained in
the participant's private account.
After all participants in both groups had made their individual contribu-
tion decisions the winner of the contest was probabilistically determined on
grounds of the relative total expenditures between the two rivaling groups. A
prize of 4000 MUs was allocated to the group with a probability that equals
the total number of MUs invested by individuals belonging to the same con-
ict party divided by the sum of MUs invested by all participants. The prize
was equally distributed among all members of the winning party independent
of their individual investments to capture the non-rival and non-excludable
nature of group specic rent-seeking that creates intra-group free-riding in-
centives. After assigning the probability of winning for both groups the
random procedure determining the contest outcome was visualized through
8
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lost or won the contest. Consequently, the prize money of 1000 MUs per
group member was transferred to participants' cumulative accounts in the
winning group. If both groups did not invest any MUs then the prize was
not assigned to any group.
In REST+PUN, after being informed of the contest outcome, individual
expenditures, and earnings of their fellow group members as well as the total
expenditures by the competing group, participants could assign a maximum
of 500 deduction points toward their own group members. Punishment was
costly. Each deduction point cost the punisher 1 MU and reduced the earn-
ings of the receiver by 3 MUs. Participants could refrain from punishing by
entering '0' in the corresponding eld on their computer screen. An experi-
mental rule guaranteed that no participant could incur negative payos due
to received punishment points. The possibility to assign punishment points
was, however, guaranteed after all possible outcomes by allowing subjects to
procure negative earnings through the cost of punishment. Participants were
not informed about the individual punishment decisions of other subjects.
They neither knew who punished them nor whether and how strongly other
group members were punished.
2.1. Experimental procedures
The main characteristic of our experimental design is the controlled varia-
tion of communication structures. In all treatments, except NOCOM, partic-
ipants were brought together in an on-line chat before each decision period.
Open-ended communication allows participants to exchange ideas, coordi-
nate behavior, and discuss the expected strategy of other participants, while
preserving full anonymity among the participants and isolating the eect of
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intonation, facial expression, and body language. In the chat room, partic-
ipants were free to discuss anything, except for restrictions against threats
and oers of side-payments, revelation of one's true identity, and insulting
language. Chat room messages were monitored in real time to guarantee
proper conduct during the experimental sessions. Each communication stage
lasted for 90 seconds.
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck In-
stitute of Economics in Germany. The experiment was programmed and run
using the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total number of 224 participants
(125 women, 83 men, 16 missing data on gender) in ten sessions participated
in the experiment. Participants were mainly undergraduate students from a
wide range of academic disciplines. Upon arriving at the laboratory, partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to their cubicles preventing communication
and visual interaction. They were given detailed instructions and a number
of control questions on paper. Instructions were read aloud including the
examples. The experiment began after participants had answered all control
questions correctly. After the experiment participants were paid privately in
cash according to their performance. On average, the experiment lasted 90
minutes. Earnings per participant ranged from e10.50 to e23.50 with an
average of e16.
3. Benchmark Expenditures
The number of repeated periods in all experimental treatments was com-
mon knowledge. Thus, the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) in each
game stage coincidences with the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
10
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individual players in their respective groups whereby the prize is allocated to
group X with a probability of X=(X +Y ) and to group Y with a probability
of Y=(X + Y ). Assuming that the participants are only motivated by their
own material welfare the payo function for a representative player i in group
X can be written as
i = Ei +
X
X + Y
1000   xi; (1)
where E denotes the player's initial endowment. Taking the partial derivative
subject to the player's decision to invest in the group account derives the
rst-order condition (X + Y )2 = 1000X. Taking into account the fact that
the contest is symmetric between groups, the material payo maximization
equivalently yields (Y +X)2 = 1000Y for a representative player in group Y.
In equilibrium, the conict parties have equal aggregate investments X = Y 
such that the equilibrium benchmark is 250 MUs per conict party.
The standard prediction pertains only to groups as conict parties, but
leaves open the question how individual team members should share the bur-
den. Consequently, any combination of investments by four group members
that adds up to 250 MUs constitutes an equilibrium. The social dilemma
structure within each group is due to the fact that the prize is shared equally
among all group members. This creates intra-group tensions emblematic to
situations characterized by models of team rent-seeking.
The standard subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is aected neither
by communication opportunities nor by the opportunity to punish. Despite
the non-binding and non-veriable nature of communication, substantial ar-
guments exist to revise the theoretical kernel that is used to predict individual
11
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one of the most conspicuous outcomes in the literature (Ostrom et al., 1994;
Ledyard, 1995; Bochet et al., 2006) is that communication enhances coop-
erativeness. This has consequently inspired renements of economic theory
(Rabin, 1994; Farrell, 1995; Crawford, 1998) showing that the dissemination
of useful information both about the other players' preferences and intentions
increases the likelihood of establishing stable cooperative agreements among
independently acting players. Yet, the debate is still ongoing as to why
communication aects outcomes in diversely structured problems of strate-
gic interaction. A comprehensive review of existing evidence suggests that
the expression of voluntary, though non-binding, commitments and the de-
velopment of joint group identity that supports the salience of shared social
values seem to drive the observed eects of communication (Bicchieri, 2002;
Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007). In view of this literature, we expect that com-
munication potentially changes the individuals' reference point for optimal
behavior in our experiment.
Instead of opportunistically maximizing their own self-interest, individu-
als may express compassion toward other persons with whom they are able to
share their thoughts about the correct behavioral approach and appropriate
expenditure targets. That is, individuals may consider maximizing the joint
payo of their own group members or of those with whom they are engaged
in communication. Following a similar approach as in Sutter and Strassmair
(2009) we derive the optimal expenditures under dierent communication
structures relaxing the assumption that communication may enhance coop-
eration and coordination only through self-interested opportunism.
Consider the restricted communication structure (REST), in which con-
12
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have no explicit means to send messages to participants that belong to op-
posing conict party. Assuming that participants are motivated to maximize
the joint welfare of their own group the payo function for a representative
group can be written as
X = E +
X
X + Y
4000   X; (2)
where E denotes the sum of players' initial endowments within their re-
spective group. Applying the same solution concept as in the case of self-
interested opportunism, the rst-order conditions for groups X and Y are
(X +Y )2 = 4000X and (Y +X)2 = 4000Y , respectively. Hence, the equilib-
rium optimal joint expenditure under the assumption that all other members
of the group are maximizing the same target is 1000 MUs per conict party.
Comparing the equilibrium expenditures between self-interested oppor-
tunism and an attempt to maximize the joint group welfare, it can be seen
that the expenditure level most benetting the group is higher than the level
most benecial for an individual. At the same time, all expenditures above
1000 MUs are harmful to the group. Yet, such excessive levels of expendi-
tures are not completely unexpected. Should the intra-group communication
encourage intergroup hostility that manifests the willingness to harm the
opposing party, group members may consider maximizing the dierence in
payos between their own and the rivaling group. Such spiteful and malev-
olent motivations to reduce someone's payo without any direct benet to
oneself or without directly reciprocating unfair action are not entirely un-
common in the economic literature (Herrmann et al., 2008; Herrmann and
Orzen, 2008; Leibbrandt and L opez-P erez, 2008) and thus may also play a
13
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Assuming that the individuals are jointly maximizing the payo dierence
between their own and the rivaling group the payo function for a represen-




4000   X)   (
Y
Y + X
4000   Y ): (3)
Applying the same solution concept as above one derives the rst order-
conditions (X + Y )2 = 8000X and (Y + X)2 = 8000Y for both conict
parties. Solving this system of equations yields an equilibrium of 2000 MUs.
Consider next the intergroup communication structure (INTER) that of-
fers open communication forum to all participants across the two conict
parties. Following the same line of argumentation as above and assuming
that participants are motivated to maximize the joint payo of those with
whom they are engaged in communication the payo function can be written
as
 = E + (
X
X + Y
4000   X) + E + (
Y
Y + X
4000   Y ): (4)
Considering the function re-written for both conict parties as
4000(X+Y )
X+Y  
(X + Y ) and following the same procedures as above one recognizes that
the joint payo is maximized at the smallest possible positive level of expen-
ditures, meaning that one of the individuals engaged in intergroup contest
invests 1 MU to secure the presentation of the exogenous prize.
It is straightforward to see that the social eciency is maximized at the
smallest positive level of total expenditures. All investments above the min-
imum are socially wasteful independent of the communication structure or
14
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expenditures are aggregate quantities and do not allow us to shed light on
question how expenditures should be divided within and between conict
parties. Individual free-riding incentives are present within the conict party
under any conceivable aggregate benchmark. A particularly convoluted de-
cision problem is created when aiming to maximize the social eciency as
coordination is required not only within a conict party but also between
groups. An array of possible strategies to achieve a stable collusion between
conict parties to maximize the social welfare and their empirical relevance
are discussed in the results section.
4. Results
The main scientic object of the study is to characterize the consequences
of distinct communication structures on socially wasteful conict expendi-
tures. We begin the analysis by studying the dierences between restricted
and open communication structures on conict expenditures and compare
them to the case where no communication is possible (Result 1). Then, we
study the eect of intra-group punishment in conjunction with restricted
communication (Result 2) and the impact of communication on conformity
(Result 3). Thereafter, we investigate the mechanisms that are at play in
our treatments (Result 4). Finally, we consider the contents of communica-
tion and characterize dierent types of arguments and how they aect the
outcomes of collective conict behavior (Result 5).
Table 1 sets the stage for our analysis and provides an overview of the
mean per-period conict expenditures averaged over all periods across con-
ict parties in each treatment. A very large eect between dierent communi-
15
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Treatment Group expenditures Std. Conict Subjects
(average) pairs
No-communication 1012.05 319.94 6 48
Restricted communication 1456.41 336.21 8 64
Open communication 352.87 390.90 8 64
Restricted com. + punishment 1396.07 492.49 6 48
cation structures on group contributions is observed. We nd that conict ex-
penditures are more than fourfold in REST as compared to OPEN (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (two-tailed): Z=-3.151, n=16, p=0.002).3 In addition, we nd
that conict expenditures are signicantly larger in REST as compared to
NOCOM (WRS: Z=-2.066, n=14, p=0.039) and that conict expenditures
are signicantly lower in OPEN as compared to NOCOM (WRS: Z=-2.324,
n=14, p=0.020). The joint null hypothesis that the observations in these
three treatments are drawn from identical populations is clearly rejected
(Kruskall-Wallis two-tailed test: 2 = 13:119, df=2, p=0.001). Mean group
expenditures in all three treatments exceed the expected group expenditures
based on the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium (250 MUs). While mean group
expenditures in OPEN are closest to the selshness and social eciency pre-
dictions, in the REST treatment mean group expenditures (1456.41 MUs) lie
between the benchmarks that subjects maximize aggregated group outcome
(1000 MUs) and the dierence in outcomes between rivaling groups (2000
MUs).
Figure 1 depicts the temporal pattern of mean conict expenditures in
3Notice that in our dataset each conict pair (two rivaling four-person groups) consti-
tutes a statistically independent observation used to evaluate the statistical signicance of
experimental results.
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observe that the suggested sharp treatment dierences in table 1 are robust
over time. First, the dashed line for REST is always above the straight line
for NOCOM. Second, the dotted line for OPEN is always below the straight
line for NOCOM. Appendix A provides the temporal patterns for all conict
pairs separately and illustrates that our treatment dierences are unlikely to
be driven by outlier groups.
Figure 1 about here
Result 1. The eect of communication on conict expenditures depends
on the communication structure. Communication within conict parties in-
creases conict expenditures, whereas open communication between conict
parties decreases conict expenditures as compared to the no communication
treatment.
The nding that communication spurred group members in REST to
increase their conict expenditures is consistent with the hypothesis that
within group communication helps group members to establish a norm of
no free-riding. Yet, group discussions frequently cover aspects of human be-
havior well beyond agreeing upon the level of contributions. Communication
forums are used to establish group specic internal norms, as well as rhetor-
ical sanctions for those who preach the mutual understanding. Parallel to
verbal sanctions, recent studies have shown that a considerable fraction of
individuals is willing to incur costs to punish free-riders which can help to
mitigate collective action problems in the context of common-pool resources
17
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sify such problems in the context of intergroup contests (Abbink et al., 2010).
It has been suggested that communication (or "non-monetary" punishment)
and monetary punishment can be independently used to establish a norm
of no free-riding (Masclet et al., 2003) but that the social welfare is higher
if individuals have the possibility to sanction both informally and formally
(Noussair and Tucker, 2005). We were interested whether the opportunity to
communicate with group members functions as a complement or substitute
for costly punishment in intergroup contests.
Table 1 suggests that communication and punishment work as substitutes
in the context of intergroup contests. The mean group conict expenditure
is not higher but insignicantly lower in REST+PUN as compared to REST
(1396 vs. 1456 tokens; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Z=-0.129, n=14, p=0.897).
In gure 2, we observe that there is also no clear dierence in the temporal
patterns of these two treatments. Moreover, costly punishment in conjunc-
tion with free-form communication appears to primarily create a hypothetical
threat that is rarely used in practice. Actual punishments were meted out
only in two percent of all potential events. The rareness of punishment in
conjunction with communication is in line with the contents of our commu-
nication protocols where participants oftentimes express their distrust on the
usefulness of punishment. Similar ndings pertaining to the combination of
punishment and communication are reported in Janssen et al. (2010).
Figure 2 about here
Result 2. Conict expenditures do not further increase when individuals
have an opportunity to sanction their own group members in conjunction
18
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We complete the aggregate level analysis by examining the within-group
dispersion of contest expenditures. Figure 3 depicts the development of
median absolute dierences in contest expenditures over all periods in all
treatments. Following the same procedure as with the average expenditures,
we reject the joint null hypothesis that the measures of dispersion for NO-
COM, REST, OPEN, and REST+COM are drawn from identical populations
(Kruskall-Wallis two-tailed test: 2 = 11:969, df=3, p=0.007). We are simi-
larly able to reject the null hypothesis of identical populations using pairwise
comparisons for NOCOM vs. REST (Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z=-3.098,
n=14, p=0.002), NOCOM vs. OPEN (WSR: Z=-2.324, n=14, p=0.020), and
NOCOM vs. REST+PUN (WSR: Z=-2.882, n=14,p=0.004). In comparison,
no signicant dierence in within-group dispersion between treatments with
communication is found (Kruskall-Wallis two-tailed test: 2 = 0:638, df=3,
p=0.727).4
Figure 3 about here
We provide further evidence on the eect of communication structures in
group contests by examining the responsiveness of conict parties to oppo-
nents' behaviour in each pair across treatments. Figure 4 displays average
group level contest expenditures in each conict pair during the last ve pe-
riods of the experiment. From the gure it is clear that the possibility of
4Other measures of statistical dispersion - range and coecient of variation - yield
qualitatively similar results for within group variation.
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stable coalition between conicting groups. Remarkably, in ve out of eight
pairs the agreement of cooperation through mutual communication opportu-
nity is sustained even in the last period of interaction.
Figure 4 about here
Despite considerable variation in group contributions between and within
treatments, conict parties' expenditures appear to reect their opponents'
behavior. To assess this intuition, we apply single measure random eect
intraclass correlation coecients that account for the xed degree of relat-
edness among paired conict parties in our experimental design. The coef-
cients are calculated using data that is aggregated over all periods in the
group in question. A value of 0.825 (p < 0:000) is obtained when pooling the
data over all treatments. Yet, more detailed examination reveals a strong
divergence in behavior between treatments. Computation of intraclass cor-
relation coecients separately for each treatments yields a value of 0.014
(p=0.477) for NOCOM, a value of 0.631 (p=0.027) for REST and a value of
0.951 (p < 0:000) for OPEN and a value of 0.853 (p=0.004) for REST+PUN.
The illustrated behavioral patterns and statistical tests oer support for the
observation that communication, independent of its structure, prepares the
ground for conformist behavior that follows the goals mutually agreed upon
the members of the discussion forums.
Result 3. Communication, independent of its structure, prepares the ground
for conformist behavior in group conicts.
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Conict expenditures by group in round t
Independent variables No Restricted Open Restricted Com.
(Fixed eects) Com. Com. Com. + punishment
Own group expenditures 0.222** 0.125* -0.022 0.025
in period t-1 (.067) (.063) (.055) (.078)
Opponent's expenditures 0.064 0.124* 0.185** 0.261**
in period t-1 (.067) (.063) (.055) (.078)
Conict outcome -49.473 -0.409 -104.325** -79.687
in period t-1 [1=win] (41.560) (101.819) (33.125) (148.65)
Period -11.016** -24.132** -0.079 -40.256**
(3.732) (8.566) (2.997) (12.032)
Constant 853.876** 1348.997** 329.95** 1465.36**
Random intercepts
Group Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 228 (12) 304 (16) 304 (16) 228 (12)
Log-likelihood -1625.02 -2451.67 -2163.89 -1864.04
Multilevel regression coecients of the determinants of contributions to group account
in treatments with and without communication opportunity. The benchmark value for
the outcome dummy is win in the previous period. **Signicant at 1%; *Signicant at
5%; +Signicant at 10%. Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard errors.
To investigate the determinants of observed group contributions, we build
various multilevel regression models to account for the fact that both individ-
uals and conict parties undergo repeated measurements and each conict
pair creates a cluster of related groups. Our particular interest is to analyze
the extent to which group behavior is guided by the decisions within the own
group vis- a-vis the decisions made by the opponent group in the preceding
rounds. Results in table 2 provide evidence that the nature of conditional
behavior is grounded on the structure of communication. In NOCOM, par-
ticipants are inclined to only take into account the preceding action within
their own group (p < 0:01). They neither reckon with the available informa-
tion regarding the opponent's behavior nor with the conict outcome. This
picture dramatically changes in treatments with communication.
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and across groups reveal that group behavior is conditioned on the preceding
action both within the own group and the opposing group (p < 0:05). The
higher the opponents' expenditures in the preceding period, the higher the
combined group expenditures are within the own conict party. The lat-
ter relationship also occurs in REST+PUN (p < 0:01). This suggests that
intra-group communication is likely to mediate vicious circles of tensioned
group responses which lead to the socially wasteful dissipation of resources.
In contrast, in OPEN we observe that the regression coecients indicate a
signicantly negative eect of winning the prize in the previous round on
current group expenditures (p < 0:01). Furthermore, we nd that under in-
tergroup communication conditional behavior is restricted to the preceding
action in the opposing group (p < 0:01) and not aected by the outcome
within one's own group. Combining these ndings with the picture of behav-
ior that emerges from gure 4, we are able to supplement the intuition with
econometric evidence. The observed behavioral patterns suggest that the
stable collusion between conict parties under open communication struc-
ture takes place through suggestions to take turns in winning the contest.
Result 4. Communication shifts the focus of conditional behavior from
one's own party to the behavior of the conicting party. In the case of open
communication, winning the contest decreases conict expenditures in the
subsequent period, suggesting that conict parties cooperate by taking turns
winning the contest.
To better understand the motives behind individual decisions we con-
22

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 065struct regression models with individual conict expenditures as the depen-
dent variable. The models control for individual and group level heterogene-
ity, period eects, and gender. We present for all four treatments two models,
one for all periods and one for the last four of the 20 periods. The estimation
of lagged variables on individual data mainly reects the results observed on
group level data. While observing only a limited amount of path dependency
in respect to one's own previous decisions, we nd that the individual behav-
ior is characterized by imperfect conditional cooperation in which subjects
condition their behavior with a dierent source of feedback in dierent treat-
ments. For example, in NOCOM we observe that individuals condition their
conict expenditures mainly on their own behavior in the preceding period
(Model 1) and that in OPEN individual behavior is mainly conditioned on
the conict expenditures of the rivaling group and the contest outcome in
the preceding period (Model 5).
By examining the dynamic pattern of individual contributions separately
for the last quintile of the experiment, we statistically corroborate that con-
ict expenditures do not signicantly drop towards the end of the game.
Quite on the contrary, we observe that conict expenditures even increase
in REST (p < 0:10) and REST+PUN (n:s:). The four models (2,4,6,8) for
the last quintile of the experiment suggest that our ndings are robust and
that treatment dierences in conict expenditures are unlikely to diminish
if the game was continued for larger number of periods. The observation
that conict expenditures increase in treatments with intra-group commu-
nication when advancing toward the nal period stands in sharp contrast
with the common end-game eect where free-riding steeply increases when
subjects know that the interaction is soon to reach its nal stage (Selten
24
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 065and Stoecker, 1986; Andreoni, 1988). The reversed end-game behavior sug-
gests that the dissipation of resources in intergroup conicts far above the
equilibrium expenditures cannot solely be explained by future concerns but
require understanding of group dynamics behind the individual responses
that indicate heightened willingness to engage in socially costly conict.
In table 3, we also control for gender. A number of recent studies have
suggested that men both have a higher desire for competitiveness than women
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) and may perform better in competitive en-
vironments (Gneezy et al., 2003). While our experiment does not require
psychical eort or intellective skill, it can be understood as an abstract con-
test in which competitive eort choices are elicited. At the same time, it is to
note that several previous studies have also found that women exhibit higher
risk aversion under uncertainty (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Should the po-
tential gender dierence in risk attitudes play a role in our experiment, the
eect would, however, be parallel with the willingness to compete. Based on
our experimental data, we nd no evidence for gender dierences in conict
expenditures, neither in the treatment without communication nor in our
three treatments with communication (p > 0:10).
4.1. Analysis of communication
The result section nishes with a content analysis of communication in
our three communication treatments. We study which kind of arguments dif-
ferent communication structures invoke and how these arguments inuence
individual expenditure decisions. Completing the quantitative analysis with
analyzing the contents of the communication opens opportunities to directly
observe the argumentative process underlying the strategic use of commu-
nication. Our approach to this analysis follows recent developments in the
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ed messages and their descriptions
C1 Concrete proposal Explicit proposal to contribute
certain amount
C2 Equal terms within group Proposal to choose equal contributions
within group
C3 Unequal terms within group Proposal to choose unequal contributions
within group
C4 Other's shoes Attempt to understand desires and
intentions of the other group
C5 Conditional decision Proposal to condition on other
likely contribution
C6 Forward looking argument Proposal that recognizes the expected
course of future interaction
C7 Individual commitment Promise to commit to a certain
individual contribution
C8 Proposal to take turns Proposal to take turns between groups
to win the competition
C9 Proposal to guarantee equal chance Symmetric contributions between groups
to guarantee equal probability of winning
economics literature combining the quantitative and qualitative methods of
social science (Cooper and Kagel, 2005).
We developed a coding system for dierent types of arguments based on
both ex-ante theoretical considerations and reading through parts of the con-
versations to establish empirically relevant categories of argumentation. The
full list of considered categories including their labels and detailed descrip-
tions is shown in Table 4. In the second stage, two research assistants were
independently trained to code the messages for each communication plat-
form in each period, assigning a tick for all the categories that showed up in
the given communication period. The level of agreement between coders was
assessed by computing the average Cohen's kappa coecients across all 9 cat-
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ed categories
Relative average frequency of coding Measure of
Category REST OPEN REST+PUN agreement
Concrete proposal .98 (.91) .77 (.94) .98 (1.00) .59
Equal terms within group .25 (.41) .48 (63) .21 (.71) .54
Unequal terms within group .06 (.03) .09 (13) .06 (.00) .48
Other's shoes .54 (.25) .10 (.13) .58 (.42) .59
Conditional decision .13 (.03) .02 (.00) .16 (.25) .25
Forward looking argument .22 (.28) .08 (.19) .16 (.21) .34
Individual commitment .19 (.19) .18 (.06) .17 (.17) .58
Proposal to take turns .03 (.00) .17 (.63) .13 (.17) .25
Proposal to guarantee chance .01 (.00) .15 (.56) .02 (.04) .32
Number of observations 320 (16) 160 (8) 240 (12) Avg.=.44
Measure of agreement indicates the Cohen's kappa coecient between two independent
coders. Numbers in parenthesis refer to observed frequencies during the rst communi-
cation period. Note that the open communication platform consist of eight individuals
in two four person groups, whereas restricted communication platforms consist of four
persons.
egories. We nd a fair agreement across categories (Average=.44, Std.=.15)
with considerable dierences between single categories varying from .25 to .59
such that the greatest variance comes from the most infrequent categories.
Finally, we averaged the data across independent coders to minimize the to-
tal error in categorization. All reported results relying on the categorization
of communication protocols are based on averaged values.
Table 5 presents the relative frequency of the nine classied categories in
REST, OPEN, and REST+PUN as well as the measure of agreement between
the two coders. The numbers in parentheses illustrate the frequencies that
a given category was discussed in the rst period of communication. We
observe that concrete contribution proposals are most frequently discussed
whereas other categories such as 'unequal terms within group' are only rarely
discussed. We furthermore nd that some categories are frequently discussed
throughout all periods whereas other categories are more often discussed
27
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ects of communication categories on group
expenditures
Total expenditure
Independent variables REST OPEN REST+PUN
Concrete proposal 239.19 265.67+ 455.17
Equal terms within group 114.17 -504.34** -428.01**
Unequal terms within group ; -215.68 ;
Other's shoes 23.77 214.14 -63.75
Conditional decision 55.81 ; -49.26
Forward looking argument 59.29 ; -279.07+
Individual commitment 227.39* -139.63 203.80
Proposal to take turns ; -308.80* -190.11
Proposal to guarantee equal chance ; 112.82 ;
Period -31.04** -29.35** -56.39**
Constant 1349.33** 953.94** 1782.86**
Number of observations 320 160 240
Number of groups 16 8 12
Feasible generalized least square estimates with heteroskedastic and correlated
error structure for the eects of communication categories. ; Category excluded
from the analysis if the frequency of observations was < .10. **Signicant at
1%; *Signicant at 5%; +Signicant at 10%.
in the rst period. For example, the category 'equal terms within group'
occurred more often in discussions in the rst period than in consecutive
periods. We also observe that the content of communication is dierent across
treatments. In particular, the two categories discussing forms of cooperation
between conict parties ('proposal to take turns' and 'proposal to guarantee
equal chance') were often discussed already in the rst period in OPEN
(frequency > 0:56) but rarely in the other two treatments (frequency <
0:17).
In table 6, we estimate the total conict expenditures on the occurrence of
dierent communication categories applying feasible generalized least squares
with random eects on the subject level to account for heteroskedasticity
across panels. We observe that in REST the category 'individual commit-
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ict expenditures whereas the other
communication categories do not play a signicant role. In contrast, in OPEN
the categories 'equal terms within group' and 'proposal to take turns' have
a signicant negative eect on conict expenditures. Tables 5 and 6 provide
further evidence that conict expenditures in OPEN are lower than in the
other treatments because subjects discussed and successfully followed the
strategy of taking turns.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we provide evidence challenging the view that communica-
tion is a universal means to mitigate collective action problems and show the
relevance of communication structures in intergroup conicts. We demon-
strate that communication per se is not a panacea. In particular, in situ-
ations like intergroup conicts it can even intensify the waste of resources
on conict expenditures. Our study may help to understand the behavioral
mechanism leading to substantial social ineciencies observed in many areas
of human social interaction.
We nd that conict expenditures are signicantly lower if there is open
communication within and between rivaling groups as compared to when
there is no communication. By combining econometric analysis with the
contents of our communication platforms we are able demonstrate that this
outcome is due to mutual understanding between conict parties to take
turns in winning the conict. This nding complements a variety of eld
observations (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1992), supporting the importance of turn
taking as a strategy maintaining cooperative behavior in human societies.
This study shows that conict expenditures, in particular, in the re-
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prediction, even towards the end of the game. This nding is in line with the
appearance of the 'homo rivalis' (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008), a concept as-
suming that in environments characterized by the simultaneous existence of
eciency enhancing reciprocity and competitive motives, participants' con-
tributions are mainly driven by rivalrous attitudes and less by fairness or
reciprocity. Yet, the observation that groups in the open communication
treatment are frequently able to completely avoid socially wasteful conict
expenditures supports concepts that take into account how communication
can shift the individual reference points for optimal behavior.
Our ndings may have policy implications. One possible example of such
implications is provided in the area of public funding of innovation activities.
The reported success of innovation races that oer monetary prizes to spur
innovation has recently led to a surge in indivisible incentive prizes typically
worth millions of dollars.5 As a response to this development catalyzed by
private-sector groups and charitable organizations, governments around the
world are now becoming keen to start oering prizes to encourage publicly
funded innovation races. At the same time, incentives that encourage re-
search teams to compete for an indivisible prize are likely to attenuate the
exchange of information between researchers before the innovation threshold
justifying the prize is reached. Our results indicate that the geared transi-
tion toward cash prizes in public innovation funding needs to be considered
soberly to avoid socially wasteful replication of similar research strategies.
The nding that open communication can signicantly reduce conict ex-
5See The Economist, Aug 7th 2010 (pp. 63-64), on the recent surge in innovation
prizes.
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inter-group conicts by providing an open communication infrastructure be-
tween rivaling groups, thus reducing resource waste. We have to acknowledge
both the competitive nature nature of human behavior in intergroup conicts
and the capability to cooperate in avoiding unnecessary rivalry given a suited
institutional environment.
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            Appendix B 
     
              I n s t r u c t i o n s  
 
 
Thank you for coming! You are now about to take part in an experiment on decision making. 
You have earned 2.50 Euro for showing up on time. Reading carefully the following 
instructions and taking part in the experiment you can earn a considerable amount of money 
depending both on your own decisions and on the decisions of others.  
 
These instructions and the decisions to be made are only for your private information. During 
the experiment you are neither allowed to communicate in the laboratory nor with someone 
outside the laboratory. Please switch off your mobile phone. Any violation of these rules will 
lead to exclusion from the experiment and all payments. If you have any questions regarding 
the rules or the course of this experiment, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist 
you privately.  
 
During the experiment all decisions and transfers are made in points. Your total income will 
be calculated in points and at the end of the experiment converted to Euros at the following 
rate: 
            25 Points = 0.01 Euro 
 
The experiment consists of twenty (20) consecutive decision periods. Your total earnings 
will be determined as a sum of your earnings from all these periods.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be divided into groups of four (4) 
individuals. During the experiment you will interact with your own group members and one 
other group of four participants. The composition of the groups will stay the same in each 
period. This means that you interact throughout the experiment with the same people both 
within your own group and in the other group. You will never be informed about the real 
identity of other participants in this experiment; neither will they know with whom they 
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              Experiment 
 
At the beginning of each period all participants are endowed with 1000 Points. You can then 
use these points to invest in ‘contest tokens’ for your team. Each contest token you buy costs 
you 1 point and you can purchase up to 1000 of these tokens. Any points you do not invest 
into contest tokens will simply be added to your point balance and are yours to keep. 
Likewise, your team colleagues and your opponents will have the chance to buy contest 
tokens in exactly the same way.  
 
               Contest for a prize 
 
In each 20 periods, there will be contest for a prize between your own group and another 
group. The prize is worth 4000 points  - 1000 for each team member - and your chances 
of winning the prize depend on how many contest tokens your team has bought and how 
many contest tokens your opponents have bought. As soon as everybody has chosen how 
many contest tokens to buy, a lottery wheel will determine whether your team or your 
opponents win the prize.  
  
                                Lottery wheel 
 
The lottery wheel is divided into two shares with different colours. One share belongs to your 
group and the other share belongs to the other group. The size of your share and the size of 
the other group’s share on the lottery wheel are exact representations of the number of contest 
tokens bought by your group and the other group. For instance, if your team and your 
opponents have each bought the same number of contest tokens, each team gets a 50 percent 
share of the lottery wheel. If your team has bought twice as many contest tokens as the other 
group has, your team gets two thirds of the wheel and the other group gets one third of the 
wheel.  
 
Once the shares of the lottery wheel have been determined, the wheel will start to rotate and 
after a short while it will stop at random. Just above the lottery wheel there is an indicator at 
the 12 o’clock position. If the wheel comes to a halt such that the indicator points at your 
group’s share your group wins. If the wheel comes to a halt such that the indicator points at 
the other group’s share, the other group team takes the prize and your group loses.  
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          S h o r t   s u m m a r y  
 
Your chances of winning the prize increase with the number of contest tokens your group 
buys. Conversely, the more contest tokens the other group buys, the higher the probability that 
you lose. If one of the groups does not buy any contest tokens, the other group wins the prize 
with certainty. If nobody buys any contest tokens, no lottery takes place and nobody receives 
the prize.  
    Your  total  earnings 
 
Your total earnings from the experiment will be determined as a sum of your earnings from 
your private points balance and income from the contest. This combined points balance will 
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___________________________________________________________________________
  Additional instructions for restricted communication treatment 
________________________________________________________________ 
               Communication  
 
At the beginning of each period, before you and your group members decide how many 
contest token you buy, you will have an opportunity to communicate with the other members 
of your group. The communication takes places in a chat forum and lasts at maximum 90 
seconds. A clock will show you how much time you have left in the communication period. 
Should you need less than 90 seconds to communicate with the other group members, you can 
advance to a next stage by pressing the ‘OK’ button on your computer screen. Please notice 
that the participants in the other group have an equal chance to communicate with each other 
during the 90 seconds.   
 
You and other members of your group are invited to use your keyboards to type messages to 
one another. At the beginning of the experiment a letter A, B, C or D has been assigned to 
you. When you type a message to communication platform, your identification letter will 
appear before the message. This letter will remain fixed during the whole experiment. You 
can indicate in the text of a message that the message is intended primarily for a particular 
team member, for instance by typing “I agree with you, C.” However, any message sent to 
your fellow group members will automatically appear on the screens of all members of your 
group (but not on those of members of the other team). 
 
    Communication  Rules 
 
During a communication period, you can discuss anything you like; including what you think 
is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do, or what you would like others to 
do. However, there are two important restrictions on the types of messages that you may send.  
 
(1) You may not send a message that attempts to identify you to other team members. 
Thus, you may not use your real name, nicknames, or self-descriptions of any kind 
(“Tom Smith here,” “I’m the guy in the red shirt sitting near the window,” “It’s me, 
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Sandy, from French class,” or even “As a woman [Latino, Asian- American, etc.], I 
think…”).  
 
(2) There must be no use of abusive language, and threats or promises pertaining to 
anything that is to occur after the experiment ends. 
 
The team organizing this experiment will screen your messages. If your message is found to 
violate either rule, you may be excluded from the payment in this experiment. 
__________________________________________________________________________
  Additional instructions for open communication treatment 
________________________________________________________________ 
          Communication 
 
At the beginning of each period, before you and your group members decide how many 
contest token you buy, you will have an opportunity to communicate with your group 
members and the members of the other group. The communication takes places in a chat 
forum and lasts at maximum 90 seconds. A clock will show you how much time you have left 
in the communication period. Should you need less than 90 seconds to communicate, you may 
advance to a next stage by pressing the ‘OK’ button on your computer screen. Please notice 
that all participants have an equal chance to communicate with each other during the 90 
seconds.   
 
You and other members of your group are invited to use your keyboards to type messages to 
one another. At the beginning of the experiment a letter A, B, C or D has been assigned to 
you. When you type a message, your identification letter, as well as your group number 
(which is either 1 or 2) will automatically appear before the message. The identification letter 
and number will remain fixed during the whole experiment. You can indicate in the text of a 
message that that message is intended primarily for the other group for instance by saying “I 
agree with group 1”, or to a particular member of your or the other group, for instance by 
typing “I agree with you, C 1.” However, any message sent to your and the other group 
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    Communication  Rules 
 
During a communication period, you can discuss anything you like; including what you think 
is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do, or what you would like others to 
do. However, there are two important restrictions on the types of messages that you may send.  
 
1.  You may not send a message that attempts to identify you to other team members. 
Thus, you may not use your real name, nicknames, or self-descriptions of any kind 
(“Tom Smith here,” “I’m the guy in the red shirt sitting near the window,” “It’s me, 
Sandy, from French class,” or even “As a woman [Latino, Asian- American, etc.], I 
think…”). 
2.  There must be no use of abusive language, and threats or promises pertaining to 
anything that is to occur after the experiment ends. 
 
The team organizing this experiment will screen your messages. If your message is found to 
violate either rule, you may be excluded from the payment in this experiment. 
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___________________________________________________________________________
  Additional instructions for restricted communication  
            + punishment  treatment 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
At the end of each decision period, after the lottery wheel has come to a halt and the winning 
team is determined, you will see how much each member in your group invested into a group 
account. You will now make a decision whether to decrease the earnings of your group 
members by assigning deduction points to them (not to members of the other group). 
Notice that all members in your group have the same opportunity.  
 
Your task is to decide how many deduction points you want to assign to each other member in 
your own group. You may assign up to 500 points in total in each period. If you do not want 
to change the earnings of a specific group member, you have to enter 0 into a corresponding 
input field on your computer screen. Each deduction point you assign costs you 1 point and 
will decrease the earnings of its target by 3 points. Similarly, the other members in your 
group an opportunity to assign deduction points to you. Each received deduction point will 
decrease your earnings by 3 points.  
  
All deductions from the earnings after the contest stage will be determined as a sum of 
assigned and received deduction points from the current period. There is only one exception 
to this rule. Should the cost of received deduction points exceed the individual earnings after 
the contest stage, earnings will be reduced to zero. Nevertheless, a participant has always to 
incur the costs of all deduction points he/she assigns.    
 





a)  If my group buys 1000 contest tokens, and the other group buys 2000 contest tokens in 
a period, what is the probability for my team to win the prize?   ______________ 
b)  If my group buys 0 contest tokens, and the other group buys 1 contest tokens in a 
period, what is the probability for my team to win the prize?   ______________ 
c)  If I buy 300 contest tokens, and my team wins the prize how many points do I collect 
in this period? _______________ 
d)  If I buy 300 contest tokens, and each of my group members buys 200 contest tokens, 
how many points do I collect in this period if my team wins the prize? ___________ 
How many points do each of my group members collect in this period? ____________ 
e)  If I buy 150 contest tokens, and the other team wins the prize in this period, how many 
points do I collect in this period? _________ 
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